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Abstract: 
The concept of tribal sovereignty frequently conflicts with that of congressional plenary power, depending on the definition and basis
of plenary power. Analysis of 107 federal court cases between 1886 and 1914 suggests that when plenary power is seen in terms of
preemption and exclusivity, it may help to protect tribal sovereignty from private or state incursions. However, if plenary power is
defined as absolute and unlimited, tribal rights are not constitutionally protected against federal actions. Although tribes are properly
regarded as extra-constitutional entities, they are often treated as inferior in relation to Congress by the courts.
Full Text: 
The 200-year-old political relationship between American Indian tribes and the United States remains both problematic and
paradoxical because of the conjuncture of geographical, historical, political, and constitutional issues and circumstances that
influence tribal-federal affairs. A central feature of this dynamic dialogue is the incongruous relationship between the United States
Congress's exercise of plenary power and the tribes' efforts to exercise their sovereign political rights. This essay traces the historical,
legal, and political origins and transformation of this pivotal concept from 1886 to 1914, an important period in its development.
Analysis of 107 federal court cases and of the plenary power concept reveals that congressional plenary power has several
distinctive definitions. Depending on which definition is used by the court and whether the term is based on constitutional or extra-
constitutional doctrine, determines whether the court's decision will adversely or positively affect tribal sovereignty, political rights, and
resources.
One of the perennial puzzles in intergovernmental relations and constitutional law is the following question: What is the relationship
between American Indian tribal governments, that exercise certain sovereign rights, and the United States government which
presumes a plenary power with regard to tribes? Despite the federal government's presumption[1] of vast authority over tribes,[2]
plenary power remains a problematic concept, particularly when paired with the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
There is also considerable disagreement among scholars on whether plenary power is a necessary congressional power which
protects tribes, or whether it is an abhorrent and undemocratic concept because it entails the congressional exercise of wide political
authority over tribes. While the principal focus of this essay is to detail the history and evolution of plenary power as defined by the
Supreme Court during a critical historical era, it is important first to provide some discussion of an equally pivotal concept: tribal
sovereignty.
There is a startling array of interpretations of tribal sovereignty. For years the classic reference has been that of Felix Cohen who
asserted that "from the earliest years of the Republic the Indian tribes have been recognized as `district, independent, political
communities,' and as such, qualified to exercises powers of self-government, not by virtue of any delegation of powers from the
Federal government but rather by reason of their original tribal sovereignty" (1972 ed.: 122). John Marshall, in the pivotal case
Worcester v. Georgia, 21 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, defined tribal sovereignty as a function of collective political rights. He described tribes as
"distinct peoples, divided into separate nations, independent of each other, and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws" (pp. 542-543).
For Vine Deloria Jr. (1979), on the other hand, sovereignty has less to do with self-government and political rights and more to do
with "continuing cultural and communal integrity." "Sovereignty," Deloria said, "in the final instance, can be said to consist more of
continued cultural integrity than of political powers and to the degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it
suffers a loss of sovereignty" (pp. 26-27).
For the purpose of this essay, we define tribal sovereignty as an understanding that every tribal person has the right and the
responsibility to be an actor, not merely an object, in decisions affecting his or her community. It is the political will of the people that
ensures the vitality of sovereignty.
The usage of plenary power to describe the Congress's political relations with North American tribes distinguishes America's
indigenous groups as the nation's original peoples. On the other hand, the fact of its persistence entails an exceptional political status
for tribal nations that find their pre-constitutional sovereign political and legal status can be radically reaffirmed or unilaterally altered,
even quashed, at any time by congressional laws, judicial opinions, or administrative actions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The vacillations in the way the term plenary has been defined and the manner in which it has been institutionalized indicates a critical
difference between the political status of American states and tribes with respect to their relationship to the federal government. The
Supreme Court has held that while "the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself," Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1984), states do enjoy legal and constitutional protections against arbitrary federal action
because of the doctrine of enumerated powers. In other words, while Congress can exercise significant power over the states, it is
doubtful that it could legislate a state out of existence. Regarding tribes, however, the Congress has acted to "legislate tribes [and
bands and rancherias] out of existence" (Rotenberg, 1987:92), through the termination[3] policy initiated in 1953 and continuing into
the 1960s.
However, a little-known dimension which further complicates tribal-federal intergovernmental relations involves the fact that both
before and even during the period 1886 to 1914 when congressional plenary power (defined as unlimited-absolute) was exercised in
its most virulent and unabashed form, there were numerous occasions where Congress and the executive branch could not or would
not employ the plenary power doctrine to force tribes to comply with a particular treaty, agreement, or federal statute. Frequently,
tribal leaders and their constituencies simply voted down pending bilateral agreements or laws perceived as potentially injurious or
unfair.[4] These laws, treaties, or agreements would then be returned to Washington for revision or tabled indefinitely if Washington
could not secure tribal consent.[5]
This prompts an important question. If the Congress did indeed have unfettered plenary power over the tribes-and the Supreme Court
in a 1903 decision, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 553, went so far as to say that Congress had always had this power-why did it
not simply use it all the time? "Why," as Deloria asked (1989), "all the hoopla over treaties and agreements? Why, at that very
moment, were a number of treaty and agreement commissions in the field on several reservations asking the tribes to make treaties
and agreements with the United States?" (pp. 221-222).
In this essay we explore the following questions: What does "plenary power" mean? What conjuncture of events accounts for its
eruption in the area of Indian law and policy in the 1880s? What factors led the Supreme Court to suggest a modicum of moral
constraint on the Congress s exercise of power in 1914, without foreclosing the possibility that Congress could still wield unfettered
political authority over tribes so long as the action is not "arbitrary" and is founded on some "reasonable basis"? Finally, how and why
does the concept plenary power continue to be a viable political doctrine in a democratic country founded on the principles of limited
government?
Scholarly Views and Expectations
Research on plenary power has increased considerably since the 1970s. These were the halcyon days of tribal self-determination
and Indian political activism, when Vine Delorla Jr. in a number of publications (1969, 1970, 1974, 1977) urged tribal people and the
scholarly community to systematically investigate the linchpin legal and political doctrines that undergirded the tribal-federal
relationship.
One of the first scholars to focus some attention on the relationship between federal plenary power and tribal sovereignty was Robert
Coulter. He wrote two articles in the late 1970s (1977, 1978) that briefly examined how plenary power had worked to seriously
disadvantage tribes in fundamental legal ways. Coulter admitted, however, that "the origins of the plenary power doctrine and the
legal foundations were unclear" (1977:8).
In the 1980s two important legal studies sought to bring clarity to the subject. They focused on the origins and the factors involved in
the perpetuation of the plenary power concept. These articles, the first a note titled "Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs after
Weeks and Sioux Nation" (1982) and the second, an excellent piece by Nell Jessup Newton called "Federal Power over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope, and Limitations," (1984), went far toward explaining the legal history of the concept.
Other researchers also employed the term (Barsh and Henderson, 1980; Ball, 1987; Wilkinson, 1987; Kronowitz et al., 1987;
Laurence, 1988; Townsend, 1989; Williams Jr., 1990; Shattuck and Norgren, 1991; and Hauptman, 1992). Most of these
commentators, excepting Shattuck and Norgren (political scientists) and Hauptman (historian), and those previously cited, are legal
scholars. While law is certainly a fundamental discipline, political scientists-who should be concerned about a subject that
encompasses institutional autonomy and interaction, constitutional allocations of authority, legitimate use of power, and federalism-
have paid negligible attention to this concept and its relation to tribal sovereignty.[6]
Moreover, there has been no systematic or long-term examination of empirical data on the Supreme Court's activities during the
critical era[7] in which the plenary power doctrine as applied to tribes by the Supreme Court first appeared, was then expanded to
unparalleled proportions, and was finally dampened in the 1914 Perrin case.
This three decade period comprised the federal government's most intensive effort to assimilate American Indians. The General
Allotment policy, inaugurated in 1887 (24 St. 388), whereby the Congress sought to turn American Indians into Christianized private
property landowners, was the central weapon in the federal government's assimilative arsenal. There was a multi-pronged effort to
detribalize indigenous peoples. The principal components in the federal government's assimilation policy[8] were:
Land loss via surplus land sales, specific allotment acts, amendments to the allotment policy, and fraudulent activities by land
speculators and some state officials; Sponsorship of efforts to Christianize tribal members; Imposition of federal criminal Jurisdiction
over certain crimes in. Indian Country (35 St. 1088); Eradication of Indian culture as a federal goal. This was facilitated by the
establishment of Courts of Indian Offense.
Most commentators agree that the plenary power era for Indian tribes and their relations to the federal government was inaugurated
with the Supreme Court's decision in U.5 v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), though the term was used in previous cases outside
Indian law.
Although the term "plenary" is absent from Kagama, other language evidences the court's support of Congress's efforts to diminish
tribal sovereignty by affirming the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act (23 St. 362, 385). The court exercised what Deloria has
termed plenary interpretive power to rationalize Congress's "exercise of plenary legislative power (1988: 261). Unable to locate a
constitutional basis for its decision, the court crafted an ingenious and bizarre two-pronged explanation: Indian helplessness and land
ownership. First, Justice Miller transmuted John Marshall's analogy of Indians as "wards" to their federal "guardians," (see Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1831), to a principle of law. Miller said: "These Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States" (pp. 383-84).
The court said that federal power over these "weak" peoples was "necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell." This power, the court held, "must exist in that [United States] government, because it never has existed
anywhere else." (p. 384). However, scholars have pointed out several untenable errors in the court's analysis.
First, how could Congress apply its laws to tribes that until that time had not been subject under the Constitution to congressional
Jurisdiction? (Rotenberg, 1987:87).
Second, if the Constitution limits the authority of the various branches to enumerated powers, why did the court cite extra-
constitutional or extra-legal[9] reasons for holding a congressional statute to be constitutional? (Deloria, 1988:261).
Finally, "consent of the governed" is a treasured democratic principle. The fact that most Indians were excluded from the American
political arena because they had an extra-constitutional status[10] and treaty-defined rights and were not U.S. citizens seemed
irrelevant to the court (Newton, 1984: 215).
Coincidentally or not, the same day as Kagama, the court unanimously held in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S.
394 (1886) that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protected corporations as "legal persons" (p. 396). In effect, one
could argue that corporate property rights were extended constitutional protection, while tribal political and property rights could be
quashed.
In 1914 the Supreme Court in Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, suggested that congressional authority was limited: "As the
power is incident only to the presence of the Indians and their status as wards of the Government, it must be conceded that it does
not go beyond what is reasonably essential for their protection, and that, to be effective, its exercise must not be purely arbitrary but
founded upon some reasonable basis" (p. 486).
The Perrin court, however, remained extremely deferential[11] to Congress. In fact, Justice Van Devanter conceded that Congress,
because of its exclusive status as the branch denominated to deal with tribes, be "invested with a wide discretion, and its action,
unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the Court" (p. 486).
Without stating it, the Perrin court had invoked a different definition of "plenary power" than the one developed in Kagama and Lone
Wolf Here the court was referencing Congress's "exclusive" power to "preempt" state law and authority.
Perrin arose during a time of flux in federal Indian policy, some of which was beginning to favor a degree of tribal self-governance. It
was an era of federal administrative incompetence and Bureau of Indian Affairs corruption; era in which a growing number of federal
policymakers accepted that tribal cultures could not be physically or intellectually eradicated and that the country would be better off if
it preserved some aspects of indigenous cultures.
It was also an era in which some efforts were made at political reform. In fact, several bills were introduced between 1912 and 1916
that were designed to allow reservation Indians the right to nominate and even to recall the Indian agents (Deloria & Lytle, 1984:
30-36). Most importantly, the first two decades of the twentieth century represented a period in which federal Indian legislation
focused less on protecting Indians from whites and more on "providing a form of trust for Indian property. Indians became an
attachment to their lands rather than owners, and although the avowed policy was that of assimilation, the change in emphasis within
the executive branch of the federal government meant that the vested interest of the Interior Department would always work to thwart
whatever initiatives Congress might take in resolving the Indian problem" (Deloria, 1985:248).
Hence, while Perrin represented a victory of sorts for tribes in that the court urged the Congress not to act "arbitrarily" when dealing
with Indians, administrative agencies like the Bureau of Indian Affairs remained largely unaccountable to Congress and especially to
tribes. More importantly, Congress's power was not constrained in any fundamental way.
Plenary Power Defined
First cited by the Supreme Court in the seminal case, Gibbons v. Ogden (22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824), plenary power often has
been used in cases dealing with the extent of federal powers. It is a confusing concept "because it conceals several issues which, for
purposes of constitutional analysis, must be kept clear and distinct" (Engdahl, 1976:363). Engdahl incorrectly posits, however, that
"no federal power is plenary in the full sense of the term, because as to all of them at least the prohibition of the Bill of Rights apply"
(Ibid.). The Bill of Rights, however, is somewhat problematic as applied to tribes because tribal governments were not created
pursuant to the Constitution. While the Indian Civil Rights Act (82 St. 77-80) of 1968 applied portions of the Bill of Rights to tribal
governments in regards to their activities over reservation residents, the Bill of Rights still does not protect tribes or their members
from congressional actions aimed at reducing tribal sovereignty, political rights, or aboriginal Indian lands.
In addition, the concept of plenary "merge[s] several analytically distinct questions" (Engdahl, 1976: 363). This is the crux of the
scholarly and public confusion about the term. First, and most important for our purposes, there is plenary meaning exclusive. This is
the definition Congress uses most frequently in enacting Indian-specific legislation, such as the Indian Reorganization Act (48 St.
985), or when it enacts Indian preference laws that withstand reverse discrimination suits (Morton v. Mancari 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
This is an exclusively legislative power Congress may exercise in keeping with its policy of treating with tribes in a distinctively
political manner or top provide a recognition of rights (i.e., American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469) that Indians
have been deprived of because of their extra-constitutional standing. As Deloria astutely observes:
There may indeed be some kind of establishment of religious
freedom for American Indians. If so, it is because Congress has
dealt with the question of the practice of Indian religions and felt
it to be necessary to extend the protection of federal laws further
in the case of Indians than the Constitution allows it to extend to
ordinary citizens. In this instance Indians are not to be regarded
as "supercitizens"; rather, the practice of Indian religion is to be
regarded as under the special protection of the federal government
in the same way that Indian water rights, land titles, and
self-government are protected. Congress has always dealt with
Indians in a special manner; that is why Congress and the federal
courts cherish and nourish the doctrine of plenary powers in the
field of Indian affairs" (1985:247.)
Plenary also is an exercise of federal power which may preempt state law. Again, Congress's commerce power is an example, as is
the treaty-making process, which precludes state involvement. Constitutional disclaimers that a majority of western states had to
include in their organic documents before they were admitted into statehood are also evidence of federal preemption. Typically, these
disclaimers consisted of provisions in which the state declared that it would never attempt to tax Indian lands or property without both
tribal and federal consent.(12)
Finally, there is plenary meaning unlimited or absolute (Newton, 1984: 196, note 3). This third definition includes two subcategories:
a) power which is not limited by other textual constitutional provisions; and b) power which is unlimited regarding congressional
objectives (Ibid.). There is ample evidence in Indian law and policy of plenary power being applied by the legislative branches and the
federal courts to tribes and individual Indians in all three ways.(13)
When Congress is exercising plenary power as the voice of the federal government in its relations with tribes, and is acting with the
consent of the tribal people involved, it is exercising legitimate authority. When Congress is acting in a plenary way to preempt state
intrusion into Indian Country, absent tribal consent, it is properly exercising an enumerated constitutional power.
However, when Congress is informed by the federal courts that it has "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, and unqualified"
(Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976 (1943) authority over tribes and individual Indians, something is fundamentally
wrong. Canfield, writing in 1881, long before individual Indians were enfranchised, observed that congressional power over tribes was
absolute because tribes were distinct and independent, if "Inferior" peoples, "strangers to our law, our customs, and our privileges."
He went on to say that "[t]o suppose that the framers of the Constitution intended to secure to the Indians the rights and privileges
which they valued as Englishmen is to misconceive the spirit of their age." (pp. 26-27). But by the time Mashunkgshey was decided,
in 1942, all Indians had been enfranchised and yet they were informed by the court that absolute power was a reality confronting
them.
Table 1 is a depiction of what we term the "plenary power spectrum." Two authors under the orthodox heading (Collins and Laurence)
assert, without citing strong evidence, that federal plenary power "has never been construed as absolute, in the sense of beyond
constitutional limits" (Collins, 1989:368, note 24).
Table 1 Plenary Power Spectrum Negative, Unlimited Devastating to Tribal Sovereignity Anonymous, Comment, 1982 Ball,
Milner, 1987 Barsh & Henderson, 1980 Cohen, Felix S., 1948, et al. Coulter, Robert, 1977 Deloria, Vine, Jr., 1977, et al.
Kennan, George, 1902 Kreiger, Heinreich, 1933 Kronowitz, Rachel, 1987 O'Brien, Sharon, 1980 Rottenberg, Daniel, 1987
Shattuck & Norgren, 1979 Townsend, Mike, 1989 Williams, Robert, 1983, et al. Mixed Unlimited, Exclusive Hurts/Helps
Tribal Sovereignty Cohen, Felix S., 1942 Deloria, Vine, Jr., 1985 Newton, Nell J., 1984 Pound, Cuthbert, 1922 Orthodox
Positive, Limited, Exclusive Protects Tribal Sovereignity Cohen, Felix S., 1940 Collins, Richard, 1989 Deloria, Vine,
Jr., 1985 Laurence, Robert, 1988 Wilkinson, Charles, 1987
Deloria, Cohen, and Wilkinson are also listed under this category because they, in some of their writings, have utilized the "exclusive"
or "preemptive" definition of plenary to argue particular points. In addition, we have shown that there is ample case law confirming the
view that federal plenary power has indeed been defined as absolute, and is beyond the usual constitutional limits precisely because
tribes are extra-constitutional entities.
However, the largest group of authors, listed under the radical category, argue more persuasively that as regards tribal sovereignty,
treaty interpretation, and Indian property rights, federal power in relation to tribes and individual Indians has often been exercised in
an "unlimited" manner. See Table 2 for a description of these cases.
[TABULAR DATA OMITTED]
A much smaller group of commentators listed under the heading "mixed" argue, however, that plenary power is a necessary
congressional power "precisely because they [Indians] are outside the protection of the Constitution." (Deloria & Lytle, 1984:233;
Deloria, 1985:240). categories. First, we inquired whether the concept was contained in the court case, a yes or no question. In some
cases where the concept plenary was not mentioned, it was evident by the court's use of words such as "unlimited," "absolute," or "no
restrictions," that plenary power was still being exercised (i.e., Kagama and Lone Wolf ). This required the addition of a third
component "implicit."
Most Indian law scholars and historians assert that United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) is the seminal case presenting the
advent of the plenary power era. However, as noted earlier, the term "plenary" does not appear in the decision, though it is clear by
the court's unambiguous language that it was intent on establishing the political superiority of the federal government, no matter the
constitutional cost (Deloria, 1985; Rotenberg, 1987). The first appearance of the term plenary regarding tribal sovereignty was in
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445,478 (1899) in which a split court held that Congress had "plenary power of legislation." In
this case the Supreme Court was using two of the three analytically distinct definitions: unlimited and exclusive.
Second, if plenary power was cited we asked two further questions: 1) How is it defined - exclusive, preemptive power precluding
state law, or unlimited, absolute; and 2) What is the basis of plenary power - a constitutional provision(s) (commerce or treaty
clauses), or an extra-constitutional doctrine(s) (federal property ownership, Indian wardship, the theory of Indian "dependency"), or
was it unclear what basis was used?
Scholars have often combined the analytically distinctive categories of plenary power into one monolithic term. This is both confusing
and inaccurate. By breaking down the concept into its three components a more dynamic and slightly less complicated pattern
emerges. Table 2 contains every Supreme Court case from 1886 to 1914 that involved congressional power in relation to tribal
sovereignty. It shows that a plenary power citation alone does not ensure a legal defeat for American Indians in the court although
there is certainly a greater likelihood of a loss, (12-3-1 in the cases in which it was found). In the three Indian legal "victories," the
court used the exclusive definition of plenary power.
When plenary power was defined as unlimited and absolute and when it was based on an extra-constitutional doctrine, tribal
sovereignty and individual Indian rights were negatively affected (10-1).
Discussion
An important concept in the field of Indian law and policy introduced by Ball (1987) is that of "irreconcilability."
Ball posits, "we [Americans] claim that the `Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance there of
... shall be the supreme law of the land.' But we also claim to recognize the sovereignty of Native American Nations, the original
occupants of the land. These claims - one to Jurisdictional monopoly, the other to Jurisdictional multiplicity - are irreconcilable" (p. 3).
A primary irreconcilable difference centers on the dissonance of the following concepts: 1) congressional plenary power (as absolute
and unlimited), and 2) tribal sovereignty (a culturally distinct people within territorial limits with a leadership capable of making
governmental arrangements).
Tribal sovereignty, like the sovereignty of nation-states, is a dynamic, not an absolutist concept. Plenary power, on the other hand, is
considered static and absolutist whether it is wielded by proponents of federal supremacy over tribes or by advocates of tribal
sovereignty. Nevertheless, as described earlier, plenary power has three meanings. Congress and the courts are the entities which
unilaterally transmuted the bilateral relationship between tribes and the United States and they, not the tribes, are in the position of
choosing which definition of plenary power to apply. Tribes lack such a definitional luxury.
To improve intergovernmental relations, a way should be found to reconcile these two terms. The United States could settle on one of
the two following definitions of plenary power: a) exclusive or b) an exercise of federal power preemptive of state law (Engdahl,
1976:363). The United States would then disavow use of the unlimited/absolute definition as being violative of enumerated powers,
limited government, consent of the governed, and the rule of law.
This action would pay immediate dividends in improved tribal federal relations, especially from the tribal perspective, because it would
send a strong message to tribal groups and individual Indians that the federal government was prepared to return to a genuinely
bilateral political stance regarding those tribes.
Furthermore, tribes would welcome steps by the United States to reduce its use of non-constitutionally enumerated powers over their
territories and sovereign rights. More importantly, tribes have a clear understanding of the doctrine of consent, and they realize that in
the past 130 years or so this treasured democratic principle has sometimes been ignored (i.e., the BIA's administrative power over
tribal resources; the acquisition and alienation of tribal lands and resources; the tribes' inability to punish non-Indians and non-
member Indians; and tribes being denied the right to enter into foreign agreements, see Ball, 1987).
The legislative branches of the federal government have begun to seriously consider the need to reestablish bilateral relations with
tribes. Congress has established the experimental Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project (102 St. 2285; as amended 105 St.
1278) which is a major step toward restoring the tribal right of self-determination. Congress also is discussing re-establishing a more
constitutionally grounded policy with tribes - "New Federalism." This policy would resemble the bilateral agreement period (which
followed in the wake of the treaty period which ran from 1775 to 1868) between tribes and the United States which lasted from 1875
to 1914 (Senate Rep't., No. 102-216, 1989; see S. 2512 "New Federalism for American Indian Act, April 25, 1990).
On the executive side, the Clinton Administration is on record(14) as being supportive of tribal sovereignty. In his plan Clinton noted
that while "Republican administrations have given nothing but lip service over the past twelve years to an affirmation of the
government-to-government relationship," his administration would "give tribal governments more say in the distribution of federal
funds geared toward economic growth, universal access to quality, affordable health care, and improved education."
The Clinton Plan consists of three parts:
GUARANTEEING RIGHTS
-support of tribal sovereignty and self-determination -reaffirm the government-to-government relationship -protect Indian religious
sites and freedoms -reforms in the Bureau of Indian Affairs -support tribal effort to resolve local disputes with states in accordance
with federal law -reaffirm U.S. citizenship of Indians and improve their voting access
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-generate innovative strategies to develop self-sufficient economies -create public-private partnerships to give low-income tribal
entrepreneurs assistance -implement a New Enterprise Tax Cut and create community development banks -expand Earned Income
Tax Credit -repair infrastructure of reservations
HEALTH CARE
incorporate goals of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act provide a core benefits package to improve: -ambulatory physician care
-mental health services -develop more effective measures to combat Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and AIDS -keep hospital clinics open
longer
It is, however, far too early to ascertain what will transpire from a policy perspective during the Clinton-Gore administration, though
his selection of Bruce Babbitt as Interior Secretary and his appointment of Ada Deer as Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, have
generally been well-received by tribes.(15)
Returning to our historical discussion, why did the Supreme Court sporadically apply the "unlimited-absolute" definition of plenary
power to tribes, their members, and their resources in the 1880s? The judicial, political, and historical evidence supports what many
other scholars have maintained: Broadly put, it was to legitimate the unabashed and forced congressional policy of assimilation and
acculturation of tribal members into the American mainstream. As John Oberly, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, noted in his 1888
Annual Report, the Indian "must be imbued with the exalting egotism of American civilization, so that he will say `I' instead of `We,'
and `This is mine,' instead of `This is ours'" (ARCIA 1888).
It needs to be reiterated, however, that even the doctrine of plenary power, when defined as unlimited/absolute, was enforced only
sporadically.(16) As the case law attests, in several important decisions the Supreme Court - using the exclusive and preemptive
definitions of plenary power - acknowledged the government's lack of Jurisdiction in Indian Country, although it never denied that the
United States could exert its Jurisdiction if it chose. In fact, when the courts relied upon Congress's enumerated exclusive authority to
deal commercially with tribes, it employed plenary power in a more viable sense.
The idea of enumeration embodies the soul of the unconstitutional conflict between tribes and the federal government. In
constitutional law matters not involving tribes, the court has maintained, as it did in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), that the
United States "is a government of enumerated [explicitly identified] powers" (p.88). The court acknowledge that the Constitution "is
not be construed technically and narrowly," and went on to say that "it still true that no independent and unmentioned power passes
to the National Government or can rightfully be exercised by the Congress" (Ibid).
However, when Congress deals with tribes additional variables must be factored in: the treaty-defined, not constitutionally-defined
political relationship, and the pre- and extra-constitutional status of tribes. The combined effect of these factors is illustrated by the
statement that "general acts of Congress do not apply to Indians, if their application would affect the Indians adversely, unless
congressional intent to include them is clear" (Cohen, 1972 ed.:173). Morever, there is also ample historical, political, and legal
precedent for the principle that "Congress has no constitutional power over Indians except what is conferred by the Commerce
Clause and other clauses of the Constitution" (Ibid.:90).
As Deloria (1985:240) noted: "Indians receive the protection of the federal government precisely because they are outside the
protections of the Constitution; they need and receive special consideration when the federal government interacts with them and
handles their affairs. We have often called the government's power to accomplish this task `plenary' because we supposed that it
needed to be immune from arbitrary challenges which might otherwise hamper the wise administration of the affairs of Indians."
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to explain the origins and clarify the confusion surrounding a pivotal concept undergirding the tribal-federal
relationship: plenary power. The evidence shows that two of the analytical definitions of plenary power - preemption and exclusivity -
sometimes are used in a constitutionally permissible way that recognizes and protects tribal autonomy. This needed protection is
most evident when states and private interests have sought to make jurisdictional inroads into tribial territory or over tribal rights.
However, there remains the reality that although many tribes remain extra-constitutional political bodies, their political status has
sometimes been characterized by the courts as "inferior" to the "superior position" Congress is said to occupy in relation to tribes.(17)
Tribes, despite a preponderance of evidence of their "foreign" political relationship to the states and the federall government, were
informed beginning in the 1880s that they were to be treated as "wards of the nation," and that they were in a "condition of pupilage
or dependency" (Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., 135 U.S. 654 (1980). Although the Perrin decision appeared to
place some moral constraints on congressional power over tribes, the last eighty years
Key
1. If the term plenary is used in the case, then it is cited as explicit. If the concept plenary is not evident in the case, however, and the
Court instead uses terms like Congress's unlimited authority, supreme right, or paramount power, then it is given an implicit citation.
2. Exclusive: Congess, because of the location of tribes in the Commerce Clause and its role in ratifying Indian treaties, is the sole
branch of government constitutionally authorized to deal with tribes. The Congress has sometimes delegated its authority to federal
administrative officials and occasionally to states.
Preemptive: An exercise of federal power which preempts, or precludes, state law.
Unlimited/Absolute: This category includes exercises of federal power which are unencumbered by constitutional constraints.
3. This category details the basis of the plenary power term. Historically, the court has cited constitutional clauses (i.e., Commerce,
Treaty, Property, expenditures for the general welfare, and the war - making clause) to justify congressional plenary power. Other
times, the court has given extra - constitutional or extra - legal reasons for holding that Congress has plenary power over tribes (i.e.,
federal property ownership, Indian wardship, or tribal dependency). Finally, the court has occasionally been equivocal and has failed
to articulate precisely what the U.S. government's authority over tribes is based on. This is labeled unclear.
4. As Jonathan Casper (1976) has shown, judicial decision - making is often much more than a winner-take-all/loser-go-home
scenario. In fact, judicial outcomes are not always decisive and sometimes even losers contribute importantly to outcomes that later
emerge. For our purposes, a victory is recorded if the Supreme Court awards the tribe most of its demands, or if the court shields the
tribe from constitutional or state impositions not requested or consented to by the Indians. A loss is recorded if the court off firms in
the United States a legal right to confiscate indian land, abrogate Indian treaties (or provisions of treaties), or reflects a diminution of
tribal rights even when Indians are not parties in the case. The one case listed as anomalous, Matter of Heff did not involve tribal
sovereignty. bear out a stark reality: there are no constitutional restrictions on what the federal government may do to tribes or the
remaining vestiges of tribal sovereign rights or aboriginal lands.
This is evident in the Indian reorganization era of the 1930s which resulted in the forced abandonment and delegitimation of some
traditional tribal governments.[18] It is evident in the federal government's termination 9and relocation policy of the 1940s-1960s.[19]
It is most recently evidenced by a host of Supreme Court decisions effectively disregarding the rights of tribes and their citizens in
several areas of law: non-member Indian criminal jurisdiction (Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990), double taxation (Cotton
Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 57 USLW 4445 (1989); zoning regulations of Indian land (Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989); and most significantly the free exercise of religion (Lyngv. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) and Employment Division v. Smith, 108 L. Ed 2d 876 (1990).
Tribal nations, as pre- and extra-constitutional political-cultural-economic entities, will continue to occupy a distinctive position in the
United States. Tribes have a political status that is both dynamic and extremely tenuous. Tribes face the structural disadvantage of
having rights which the federal government is not constitutionally mandated to protect. Notwithstanding the Commerce Clause and
the treaty relationship, tribes remain "beyond the pale of the constitutional framework ... [a]nd unless and until there is some positive
move by the federal government to accept limitations on its exercise of naked political power over the tribes, Indians will remain
people without a status and, more importantly, without the ability to protect themselves from the continuing exploitation visited upon
them by, the U.S." (Deloria, 1988: 266).
Until this disparity in tribal-federal political power is rectified it is doubtful whether a viable domestic solution is possible to tribal-
federal relations.
Notes
(1.) The Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government the power to regulate Indian affairs, it merely states that
Congress shall be the branch with the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations ... and with the Indian tribes." (Article 1, sec.
8, cl. 3) (emphasis added). (2.) For the purposes of this study my focus will be on tribes rather than individual Indians. The Commerce
Clause empowers Congress to oversee the federal government's commercial relations with Indian tribes. Individual Indians who had
not yet been naturalized were extended federal citizenship in 1924 (43 St. 253). Nearly two-thirds of all Indians, however, had already
been enfranchised before 1924. Indians became citizens through several routes: as a result of treaty stipulations; the General
Allotment Act of 1887, as amended; or having served in World War I (see Haas, 1957:16; and Rice, 1934:86-87). The granting of
U.S. citizenship did not end tribal citizenship, however. The 1924 Act read: "That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any
manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property ..." Hence, this created a class of Americans with
dual citizenship. Furthermore, as citizens, Indians are ostensibly accorded the same constitutional safeguards as other individuals.
But this is problematic as well (see Ball, 1987:11; and Barsh and Henderson, 1980:96; and Deloria, 1977:6). (3.) "Termination" was
the term developed in the late 1940s and eventually sanctioned in 1953 under House Concurrent Resolution 108, whereby the U.S.
government sought to unilaterally sever, end, or "terminate" the federal government's political relationship with various Indian tribes,
bands, and rancherias. See Donald Fixico's Termination and Relocation (Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1986); and Charles F. Wilkinson
and Eric R. Biggs, "The Evolution of Termination Policy" American Indian Law Review 5 (Summer 1977):139-184. Termination,
although renounced on several occasions from 1958 forward, was not congressionally disavowed until April 28, 1988 (102 St. 130).
(4.) Special thanks to Professor Vine Deloria, Jr. for bringing this list of infrequently cited laws to my attention. See the following
documents and their provisions for explicit examples of such tribal non-compliance: a) Treaty with Mixed Bands of Bannacks and
Shoshones [sic], October 14, 1863 (Kappler, Vol. V, 1941:693). b) U.S. Statute. "An act authorizing the payment of annuities into the
treasury of the Seminole tribe of Indians. April 15, 1874. 18 St. 29 (Kappler, Vol. I, 1904:150) [See the proviso which reads:
"Provided, That said agreement shall provide that the sum of five thousand dollars shall be annually appropriated out of said annuity
to the school fund of said tribe: And provided further, That the consent of said tribe to such expenditures and payment shall be first
obtained." An attached note at the bottom of the document stated the following: "Note.-Indians withhold assent."] c) Agreement with
the Crows. May 14, 1880. (Kappler, Vol. II, 1904:1063). d) U.S. Statute. "An Act to graduate the price and dispose of the residue of
the Osage Indian trust and diminished-reserve lands ..." March 3, 1881. 21 St. 509. [See the attached proviso which reads:
"Provided, however, That no proceeding shall be taken under this act until at least two-thirds of the adult males of said Osage Indian
tribes shall assent to the foregoing provisions."] e) U.S. Statute. "An Act to accept and ratify the agreement (a)["The agreement of
May 14, 1880 (Letter C above) ... was not ratified by the Crow Indians and this agreement was substituted therefore.] submitted by
the Crow Indians of Montana for the sale of a portion of their reservation in said Territory ..." April 11, 1882. 22 St. 42. (Kappler, Vol. I,
1904:195). f) U.S. Statute. "An Act to divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of Indians in Dakota into separate
reservations and to secure the relinquishment of the Indian title to the remainder." April 30, 1888. 25 St. 94 [See section 24, which
stated: "That this act shall take effect only upon the acceptance thereof and consent thereto by the different bands of the Sioux
Nation of Indians.... and upon failure of such proof [vote by adult Indians) and proclamation (issued by the President) this act
becomes of no effect, and null and void." g) U.S. Statute. An Act to ratify and confirm an agreement with the Muscogee or Creek tribe
of Indians, and for other purposes." March 1, 1901. 31 St. 861. [See the preamble which states in relevant parts: "That the agreement
negotiated between the Commission to the Five Civilized tribes and the Muscogee or Creek tribe ... as herein amended, is hereby
accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and the same shall be of full force and effect when ratified by the Creek National Council..."] (5.) Of
course, history is replete with a multitude of examples where federal officials ignored the doctrine of tribal consent and proceeded to
act unilaterally. (6.) Political scientists are, however, finally beginning to study some areas of the tribal-federal relationship, though
they have not focused systematically on the case law during this particular era. See the writings of Fetzer (1981), McCool (1985),
McCulloch (1988), Holland (1989), Gross (1989), O'brien (1989), and Shattuck and Norgren (1991). (7.) This article is extracted from
my dissertation, The Legal Consciousness of the United States Supreme Court: A Critical Examination of Indian Supreme Court
Decisions Regarding Congressional Plenary Power and Tribal Sovereignty-1870-1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina:
1990). That larger study looked at 107 federal court cases (ninety Supreme Court decisions: a list of the cases is available from the
author) which arose during what many consider the darkest chapter in federal-tribal relations. (8.) See Loring B. Priest Uncle Sam's
Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942); Henry E.
Pritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963; the diverse historical
works of Francis Paul Prucha, including Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the `Friends of the Indian' 1880-1900.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973; and Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. (9.) By extra-constitutional and extra-legal we mean factors that are not derived from
constitutional sources. These may include non-constitutional doctrines or legal constructs like the alleged "wardship" and/or
"dependent" status of Indians; the use of the "doctrine of discovery" to justify exertions of federal power over Indians and their
resources; the presumption of plenary power not related to Indian commerce; the alleged "incorporation" of Indians into the American
polity; or the racial constitution of a reservation or Indian community, to name but a few. See Philip Lee Fetzer, "Jurisdictional
Decisions in Indian Law: The Importance of Extra-legal Factors in Judicial Decision-Making," American Indian Law Review, 9 (1981):
253-272; and see Nancy Carol Carter, "Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American Indians: Land-
Related Cases, 1887-1924," American Indian Law Review, 4 (1976): 197-248, for two good examples of writings which focus on
some of these extra-legal factors and their implications for tribal sovereignty. (10.) Tribes have both a pre- and extra-constitutional
status because of their original sovereignty. Tribal nations are sovereign since they were not created pursuant to the federal
Constitution or by state action. As the Supreme Court said in Talton v. Mayes, (163 U.S. 376 (1896)), tribal rights of self-government
were not delegated by Congress and were thus not powers arising from or created by the federal constitution. Tribal sovereignty,
therefore, "is neither derived from nor protected by the Constitution" (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 170 (1982). Thus, the U.S. Bill of Rights does not apply to the acts of tribal governments. The continuing
legality of Indian treaties and the fact that Congress and the tribes have never jointly participated in any action that would lead to an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would effectively incorporate tribes into the American political system is all the proof
necessary evidencing this ongoing extra-constitutional tribal political status. (11.) William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast in an article,
"Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures," 74 Virginia Law
Review (February 1988):373-401, persuasively argue using modern social choice theory, that although the Court assumes that
legislative and electoral majorities are effective in protecting the economic rights of citizens, particularly of minority groups, there
actually is little data to support this view. They find that "majority rule provides no inherent protection for the rights of minorities" and
that "the Court's deference to legislatures in the area of economic rights is puzzling, and is inconsistent with its scrutiny of other
rights." (p. 374-375). In conclusion, Riker and Weingast explicitly state that "judicial deference to legislatures, as past actions of
legislatures clearly reveal, leads to policies that compromise the rights of minorities" (p. 399). Judicial deference, particularly in the
way the Supreme Court has utilized the political question doctrine to avoid examining issues in Indian law it deems more suitable for
the legislative branches, has been especially problematic for tribal groups which inhabit a unique political and legal space as extra-
constitutional entities. Judicial deference, therefore, continues to be one of the most troublesome areas in the tribal-federal
relationship. And so long as tribes remain lodged in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution there is little chance that the Court will
exercise the degree of judicial scrutiny of congressional actions that tribal nations would like to see. (12.) Article 26 of Washington
State's Constitution provides a clear example of a disclaimer clause: "That the people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that
they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries of this State...." (13.) See Table 2
for a list of historical cases citing the doctrine of plenary power in all three ways. As recently as 1989 in Cotton Petroleum Corporation
v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, a case involving the question of whether New Mexico could apply severance taxes to a company
located within the Jicarilla Indian reservation and already paying tribal taxes, the Court, utilizing the exclusive definition said that "the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."
And, in Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990), which dealt with whether Indian tribes had criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians, Justice Brennan (joined by Marshall), who dissented from the majority's ruling that tribal governments lack the power to try
non-member Indians, noted that "the Court's `consent theory' is inconsistent with the underlying premise of Indian law, namely, that
Congress has plenary control over Indian affairs." "Congress," Brennan said, "presumably could pass a statute affirmatively granting
Indian tribes the right to prosecute anyone who committed a crime on the reservation." (p. 2071). Brennan in this statement seems to
be utilizing both the exclusive and preemptive definitions of plenary power. The Duro decision was legislatively overturned by
Congress October 28, 1191 (105 St. 646). This law "reinstated" the power of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
within their jurisdiction, whether enrolled or not. (14.) Author has copy of "The Clinton Plan for Native Americans." (15.) See "Clinton
Names Deer to Head B.I.A." in News From Indian Country, vol. 7, no. 10 (Late May, 1993):1. (16.) See note 4 which contains several
examples supporting the fact of the Congress's sporadic enforcement of plenary power. (17.) See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U.S. 130, 155, n.21 (1982) which held that Congress' paramount authority over tribes is derived "by virtue of [Congress's]
superior position over the tribes." (18.) See Kenneth R. Philp, ed., Indian Self-Rule. (Salt Lake City, UT: Howe Brothers, 1986). (19.)
See endnote 4.
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